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Purpose: The research aims to characterize legal solutions in the field of emergency states 
- those existing and implemented in Poland and Taiwan.  
Design/Methodology/Approach: The author discusses emergency states in Poland and 
Taiwan – characteristics, premises, and procedures for introducing. The existing rules that 
were introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic will also be presented. During the 
research, the author uses legal and comparative analysis and structural and functional 
analysis. However, the interpretation method is also important, which makes it possible to 
interpret legal acts and a comparative study - in the scope of regulations in force in these 
countries. The author uses elements of the concept - descriptive and improving functional 
and modeling, and diagnostic and functional. 
Findings: The working hypothesis refers to the assumption that the current legal 
regulations in the field of emergency states are insufficient and disproportionate to the 
threat of a pandemic COVID-19. Some restrictions are necessary, but more important are 
social responsibility, self-control, and education. The essence of emergency states is 
different: protecting the State, its organs, and society against threats and dangers of 
various causes. So, the restrictions and limitations on human rights associated with them 
do not respond to the pandemic case.  
Practical Implications: As a result of conducting the comparisons, it is possible to present 
some legal changes concerning extraordinary measures and rules during a crisis. 
Originality/Value: This is a complete research for a comparative study concerning Poland 
and Taiwan. 
 
Keywords:  Extraordinary measures, emergency states, state of natural disasters, the 
functioning of the state, legal rules. 
 
JEL Code: L21, L27, N67. 
 





1Institute of State Security, War Studies University, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University, 
e-mail: e.kolodziejczak@gmail.com;  
  The Emergency States Guarantee the Functioning of the Country during the COVID-19 





The emergency states are introduced to protect the legal and security system and 
the security of its citizens. Each country has its own regulations in this area. It is 
not without reason that Poland and Taiwan are discussed - because, in several 
respects, convergent actions can be found. First, Poland and Taiwan have not 
decided to introduce extraordinary measures. However, their effects turned out to 
be different. At the beginning of the fight against the epidemic in Europe, Poland 
was praised for its quick response and introduction of restrictions. Taiwan is 
recognized as a model example of dealing with a COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
Quite a few European countries decided to make this move. However, this did not 
prevent them from spreading infections. So, or the restrictions and limitations on 
human rights associated with them are not responding to the pandemic. The 
essence of emergency states is different: protecting the State, its organs, and 
society against threats and dangers of various causes. 
 
Poland was the leader in the statistics of a small increase in infections in the EU, 
but after easing the restrictions, the results jumped. In Taiwan, no new case was 
reported from April to September.   Do the emergency states indeed guarantee the 
(proper) functioning during the COVID-19 pandemic? Or is the answer different? 
"In a crisis, governments often make difficult decisions under uncertainty and time 
constraints. These decisions must be both culturally appropriate and sensitive to the 
population. Through early recognition of the crisis, daily briefings to the public, 
and simple health messaging, the Government was able to reassure the public by 
delivering timely, accurate, and transparent information regarding the evolving 
epidemic" (Wang, Ng, Brook, 2020). 
 
2. Methodology Background  
 
First, the problems with definitions and the multitude of using "state" in Poland 
should be emphasized. Taiwan has only two states of emergency. On the other 
hand, in Taiwan, the issues of emergencies are very narrowly regulated. In Poland - 
on the contrary, as it turns out, too detailed regulations are also problematic. The 
models for introducing extraordinary measures are also different due to the other 
model of power. In Taiwan, the President has a decisive say in the assessment and 
legal possibility of introducing them with the Executive Yuan and Legislative 
Yuan. In Poland, the President presents martial law and a State of emergency but - 
at the Council of Ministers' request. Noteworthy that teach those states is 
complicated. Council of Ministers can introduce the only State of natural disaster, 
and the Ministry of Health can declare a State of epidemiological threat or State of 
the epidemic.  
 
During the research, the author used legal and comparative analysis and structural 
and functional analysis. However, the process of interpretation also was necessary, 
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which made it possible to interpret legal acts. A comparative study - in the scope of 
relative comparisons of regulations in force in these countries- was used to develop 
the research.  
 
Among the theoretical techniques, the primary research method was the analysis of 
legal acts and documents concerning issues related to excessive states and COVID-
19 regulations in Poland and Taiwan. It made it possible to know the essence of the 
premises defining a given country and identify the conditions for their introduction. 
A structural analysis was used - to examine the structures and level of organization 
of the discussed states and their elements. Using the method of functional analysis, 
it was determined what restrictions were introduced and what they change in the 
functioning of the State and society during COVID-19. These methods resulted 
mainly from identifying the research object, its elements, its surroundings, and the 
relations between them. 
 
The research aims to characterize legal solutions in the emergency states' field - 
those existing and implemented in Poland and Taiwan. The main problem is the 
question: what (and if at all) emergency states guarantee the State (on the example 
of Poland and Taiwan) during the COVID-19 pandemic, and what direction should 
changes take? In turn, the working hypothesis refers to the assumption that the 
current legal regulations in emergency states are insufficient and disproportionate 
to a pandemic threat. Due to the nature of the topic, the Author will use the concept 
- descriptive and improving; functional and modeling, and diagnostic and 
functional (Martyniak 1999; Kitler 2002). 
 
Conclusions obtained through the use of the above methods made it possible to 
isolate and consolidate the results obtained in the research course, which 
consequently led to the proposition of conceptual solutions and changes in the 
regulation of excessive states in Poland. However, the synthesis was the primary 
research method used to develop partial and conclusions and proposed solutions. 
 
Although there are many research results concerning Poland's extraordinary 
measures, the authors discuss legal rules in general. Because Taiwan is a model 
with a pandemic's fight, there are some scientific articles about this topic. However, 
it is quite difficult to find research for a comparative study concerning Poland and 
Taiwan. 
 
3.  Emergency States in Poland  
 
The extraordinary measures2  in the Republic of Poland are introduced in certain 
situations if ordinary constitutional measures are inadequate. According to the 
Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997, (Journal of Laws. no. 78, 
 
2 In Polish Constitution emergency states call extraordinary measures, but in this text, 
author will use also states of emergency.  
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item 483, as amended, hereinafter: the Polish Constitution), currently in Poland, 
there are three states: the State of natural disaster, the State of emergency, and the 
martial law, also regulating by tree statutes: the Act of 18 April 2002 –  on natural 
disasters State, (Journal of  Laws of 2017, item. 1897); the Act of 21 June 2002 – 
on emergency State, (Journal of Laws of 2017, item. 1928) and the Act of 29 
August 2002 - on martial law and the competence of the Commander-in-Chief and 
his subordination to the constitutional authorities of the Republic of Poland, 
(Journal of Laws of 2017, item 1932).  
 
Separately should be treated the State of war and a time of war, which can be 
related to martial law, but it is three different legal institutions (Kołodziejczak, 
2018). Although both the Polish Constitution and three separate laws regulate them 
in detail, there are still difficulties in legal interpretation and - importantly - to 
define and assign the appropriate individual cases, which of the states should be 
introduced. 
 
First, to consider any of the states of emergency, the constitutional and statutory 
provisions' measures must be exhausted. Only then, specific circumstances that 
may result in introducing an extraordinary form should be considered. 
 
Therefore, it should be pointed out that a situation that does not change or does not 
aim to change the essence of an organization (e.g., the State) cannot be considered 
a premise for the introduction of any form of emergency but even a crisis. 
However, if there is no adequate and effective response, it may be necessary to 
introduce them. A problem arises when there is a specific threat. Then the crisis 
response procedure should be launched, and when these mechanisms also fail, the 
culminating moment - the crisis - will occur. However, the crisis does not last long 
because either the existing situation will be brought under control, and the 
organization (e.g., the State) will return to normal functioning, or the case will 
become inflamed. Then it will be necessary to introduce emergency states 
(Kołodziejczak, 2016). Then it will be possible to consider that the characteristics 
indicated in Art. 228 of the Polish Constitution were fulfilled jointly, namely: there 
is a particular risk; 
 
1. ordinary constitutional measures have proved insufficient; 
2. constitutional standards turned out to be inadequate because they 
had been checked, used, and exhausted, not bypassed. 
 
Moreover, states of emergency must be characterized by certain principles: 
uniqueness, legality, proportionality, purpose limitation, protection of the 
foundations of the legal system, and protection of representative bodies (Prokop, 
2005). 
 
Martial law is one of the extraordinary situations. It may introduce the President of 
the Republic of Poland at the request of the Council of Ministers: "in the case of 
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external threats to the State, acts of armed aggression against the territory of the 
Republic of Poland or when an obligation of common defense against aggression 
arises under international agreement" (the Polish Constitution, Art. 229). The 
statutory definition has been elaborated. The oldest legislative version, which 
sounded like this constitutional one, already in 2011 added a distinction between 
threats of acts of terrorism and cybersecurity threats. Therefore, as confirmed by 
the legislation, the constitutional legislator reserved the introduction of martial law 
only for the gravest threat represented by war. 
 
On the other hand, President can introduce a state of emergency at the Council of 
Ministers' request, in the event of threats to the constitutional order of the State, to 
the security of the citizenry or public order (the Polish Constitution, Art. 230). Just 
as in martial law, the statutory definition allows you to enter a state of emergency if 
these situations are caused by a terrorist attack or action in cyberspace (the Act on 
emergency State, Art. 2 para. 1). It is problematic to indicate what steps could be 
considered a threat to "the security of citizenry or public order. These are vague 
terms that have not been legally defined.  
 
However, it is worth recalling the judgment of the Constitutional Court, in the 
justification of which it was indicated that: the condition of the protection of public 
order, despite its largely indeterminate nature, undoubtedly includes the postulate 
of shaping the facts inside the State in such a way that allows normal coexistence 
of individuals in a state organization. When limiting a specific right or freedom, the 
legislator is guided in this case by the care for the proper, harmonious coexistence 
of members of society, which includes both the protection of the interests of 
individual people and specific social goods, including public property (Sentence of 
Constitutional Court, 1999). The definitions of citizens' security - whether 
semantically or theoretically, indicate that it is a condition that does not pose a 
threat to a given community's life and health.3  In theory, therefore, a state of 
emergency could be considered in the case of COVID-19 in Poland.  
 
The general principles of extraordinary measures should be taken into account. 
Consequently, one should think whether the limitations of human and civil rights 
and other tools characteristic of this State would be proportional to what we want 
to achieve in this situation? This is because the content of the provisions indicates 
the increased competence of the police, and in exceptional cases of the Armed 
 
3 For example Waldemar Kiter explains: “Thus, in the case of an individual, the objects of 
security include efforts to  achieve  peace,  comfort,  quality  of  life  in  the  material  and  
intellectual  dimension, freedom from deprivation; as well as freedom from fear of threats 
to his or her (and his or her loved ones’) life and health, property, and the environment 
(natural, social, and political) in which he or she lives. The object of an individual’s efforts 
in terms of security also includes the pursuit of harmony in the environment, hygienic living 
conditions, including work and leisure, intimacy and privacy, physical integrity, empathy, 
rest, protection and care, support in need, justice, freedom and respect, satisfaction of 
subsistence needs, and much more” (Kitler, 2020). 
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Forces, to act for the security of citizens and public order, e.g., in the context of 
aggressive riots or protests on a large scale, and no real help in combating the 
effects of an epidemic. 
 
According to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, a natural disaster can be 
introduced to prevent the effects of natural disasters or technical failures and 
remove them (the Polish Constitution, Art. 232). The statutory definition has been 
expanded to include the possibility of introducing a state of a natural disaster if a 
terrorist attack or attack caused these effects in cyberspace (the Act on natural 
disasters, Art. 3 para. 2). According to Art. 3 para. 1 a natural disaster is a natural 
catastrophe or a technical failure, the effects of which threaten the life or health of 
a large number of people, property in large sizes, or the environment in large areas, 
and assistance and protection can be effectively undertaken only with the use of 
extraordinary measures, in cooperation between various bodies and institutions and 
specialized services and formations operating under unified leadership.  
 
Notably, the legal definition of a natural disaster also directly points to human 
infectious diseases. In art. 3 para. 1 point 2 indicates that a natural catastrophe is 
understood as an event related to the operation of natural forces, in particular 
lightning, seismic shocks, strong winds, intense precipitation, the long-term 
occurrence of extreme temperatures, landslides, fires, droughts, floods, ice 
phenomena on rivers and the sea, as well as lakes and water reservoirs, the mass 
occurrence of pests, plant or animal diseases, or infectious human diseases, or the 
action of another element. 
 
Hence the conclusion that this State would be more appropriate concerning the 
ongoing COVID-19 epidemic (pandemic). Since the legislator distinguishes 
another state dedicated to specific cases enumerated directly, it does not seem 
reasonable to bring the prevailing outbreak (pandemic) under citizens' security. The 
safety of citizens, including health and life, is undoubtedly so, but the current scale 
of illnesses and infections seems (and hopefully it will remain so) low. 
Recognizing the value, but also the importance of the premise that constitutes a 
threat to the "security of citizens and public order," the possibility of introducing a 
state of emergency, for this reason, should, however, be allocated to an exceedingly 
high and severe threat. 
 
4. Legal and Organization Measures during COVID-19 Pandemic – Case 
of Poland 
 
Poland declared a state of epidemiological threat due to the risk of the COViD-19 
epidemic on 14 March 2020. The State of epidemic came into force on 20 March 
2020. This State was introducing the Ministry of Health's regulation based on the 
Act of 5 December 2008 on Preventing and Fighting Human Infections and 
Contagious Diseases (Journal of Laws of 2020 item. 284, 322, 374, 567, 875, 1493). 
According to this act, the State of epidemiological is introduced by law in a given 
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territory to implement protective measures specified in the front in response to the 
risk of an epidemic.  
 
In the following situation caused by the epidemic, the authorities considered 
introducing either a state of emergency (less likely) or a natural disaster. However, 
it should be emphasized – extraordinary measures may be submitted only after 
constitutional standards are exhausted. Firstly, statutory mechanisms will be 
implemented, e.g., from the Act of 26 April 2007 on crisis management. Second, 
available legal forms should be used - in this case, from the Act of 5 December 
2008 on preventing and fighting human infections and contagious diseases.  
 
Moreover, the act was amended, which forced the use of these tools in the first 
place. Similarly, thanks to the adoption of the Act of 2 March 2020 on unique 
solutions to prevent and combat COVID-19, other contagious diseases, and the 
crises caused by them (Journal of Laws of 2020, item. 374, 567, 568, 695, 875, 
1086, 1106, 1422, 1423, 1478, 1493), additional - constitutional measures were 
gained. Therefore, not all the possibilities provided for in the statutory provisions 
have been exhausted. If the above law had not been passed, one of the great states' 
introduction would be inevitable. Despite the many votes of constitutionalists in 
Poland, it seems that the decision not to introduce any of the extraordinary 
measures was correct. 
 
One of the biggest problems was the organization and holding of the presidential 
elections, which were to take place in May 20204. The introduction of emergency 
measures in Poland would solve the problem of holding the polls. Nevertheless, the 
consequence of not organizing elections cannot necessitate the introduction of any 
of the emergency measures. According to Art. 228, during a period of introduction 
of extraordinary measures, the following shall not be subject to change: the 
Constitution, the rules on elections to the Sejm, the Senate and organs of local 
government, the laws on elections to the Presidency, as well as statutes on 
extraordinary measures (the Polish Constitution, Art. 228, para. 6).  
 
Moreover, during a period of introduction of extraordinary measures, as well as 
within the period of 90 days following its termination, the term of office of the 
Sejm may not be shortened, nor may a nationwide referendum, nor elections to the 
Sejm, Senate, organs of local Government nor elections for the Presidency be held. 
The term of office of such organs shall be appropriately prolonged. Elections to 
local government organs shall be possible only in those places where the 
extraordinary measures have not been introduced (the Polish Constitution, Art. 228, 
para. 7). Finally, elections - after discussions and even proposals for 
correspondence elections, were postponed to July 2020. 
 
 
4 Meanwhile in Taiwan free and fair presidential and legislative elections took hold in 
January. 
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During the epidemic (which de facto applies all the time), several regulations were 
announced that contained numerous restrictions. One of the basic ones is the 
regulation of the Ministry of Health of 20 March 2020 on the declaration of an 
epidemic in the territory of the Republic of Poland (Journal of Laws of 2020, item. 
491)., which contains detailed restrictions on the issues specified in the Act on 
Preventing and Fighting Human… in Art. 46 para. 4.  
 
Those regulations referred to the temporary rule of a specific method of movement; 
temporary restriction or prohibition of the marketing and use of particular items or 
food products, temporary limitation of the functioning of particular institutions or 
workplaces, prohibition of organizing shows and other gatherings of people; 
obligation to perform specific sanitary procedures, if their performance is related to 
the operation of a particular production, service, commercial or other facilities; an 
order to make real estate, premises, land available and to provide means of 
transport for anti-epidemic activities provided for in anti-epidemic plans.5  
 
The following temporary limitations were also introduced:- movement restrictions 
with social distance; mandatory covering mouth and nose in public spaces; 
particular regulation in air traffic and temporary ban many of international flights 
and rail traffic; temporarily closed borders; ban cultural events and spectacles in 
the theaters or cinemas; closed restaurants and shopping malls and large stores 
even limitations in religious ceremonies; closed operational hairdressers and beauty 
salons; as well as fitness clubs or swimming pools; schools and universities were 
also closed, but there were online classes (GOV.PL, 2020). 
 
5. Emergency States in Taiwan   
 
The extraordinary measures in the Republic of China (Taiwan) introduced in 
certain situations when there is a lack of legal mechanism. According to the 
Constitution currently in Taiwan, there are two states: martial law and emergency. 
According to Art. 39 the President may, by law, declare martial law with the 
approval of, or subject to confirmation by, the Legislative Yuan. When the 
Legislative Yuan deems it necessary, it may, by resolution, request the President to 
terminate martial law (the Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan), Art. 39; 
hereinafter the Constitution of Taiwan) 
 
However, in case of a natural calamity, an epidemic, or a national financial or 
economic crisis that calls for emergency measures, the President, during the recess 
of the Legislative Yuan, may, by resolution of the Executive Yuan Council, and 
following the Law on Emergency Decrees, issue emergency decrees, proclaiming 
such measures as may be necessary to cope with the situation. Such regulations 
shall be presented to the Legislative Yuan for confirmation; in case the Legislative 
 
5 The Act of 5 December 2008 on Preventing and Fighting… And also, in next art. 46b was 
added that those restrictions can be announced in regulation.  
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Yuan withholds warranty, the said decrees shall forthwith cease to be valid (the 
Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan), Art. 43).  The Executive Yuan 
shall have an Executive Yuan Council, composed of its President, Vice President, 
various Ministers and Chairmen of Commissions, and Ministers without Portfolio, 
with its President as Chairman (the Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan), 
Art. 58). 
 
On the other hand, the Legislative Yuan shall have the power to decide by 
resolution upon statutory or budgetary bills or bills concerning martial law, 
amnesty, declaration of war, the conclusion of peace or treaties, and other 
important affairs of the State (the Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan), 
Art. 63). 
 
Emergency decrees will be issued only when there is a lack of legitimacy for 
necessary disease prevention measures the Government has decided to carry out. 
Chien-Liang Lee pointed out three main reasons for the reluctance emergency 
state. After the SARS epidemic, Taiwan made substantial improvements to the 
legal mechanism for preventing and treating contagious diseases. The emergency 
response mechanism for infectious diseases is generally stated in the CDC Act.  
However, and it is a second point, the Parliament immediately passed the Special 
Act for Prevention, Relief, and Revitalization Measures for Severe Pneumonia with 
Novel Pathogens. Finally, an administrative order authorization through an 
emergency decree in Taiwan became less appealing than through law after 2002 
because of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 543 (Chien-Liang Lee, 2020). 
 
After martial law was lifted in 1987 following nearly 40 years of implementation, 
the Taiwanese Government has only issued an emergency decree once. After the 
island nation, it was struck by a magnitude 7.3 earthquake in 1999, which was later 
known as the Chi-Chi earthquake (Taiwan News, 2020). After this catastrophe, the 
President issued an emergency decree in response to the earthquake. The 
Government drafted and submitted to the Parliament the "Emergency Decree 
Execution Outline of September 1999". Members of the Parliament applied to the 
Judicial Yuan for an interpretation. Judicial Yuan "upheld that in principle, 
emergency decrees' content should be thorough and detailed to be executed swiftly 
without the need for supplementary regulations.  
 
When there are time constraints, and in cases where details and technicality are 
impracticable, the decrees must contain provisions expressing precise objectives. 
They may only be proclaimed after ratification by the Parliament. Since the 
authorization of an administrative order through an emergency decree is more 
restrictive than through law, in cases of an emergency (such as the SARS in 2003, 
the flood on 8 August 2009, and the earthquakes in 2016 and 2018), no emergency 
decree has been issued. Such emergencies are tackled by way of legislation and 
administrative orders" (Chien-Liang Lee, 2020). 
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6. Legal and Organization Measures during COVID-19 Pandemic – Case 
of Taiwan 
 
Which does not mean that Taiwan has not introduced restrictions? Taiwan learned 
his lessons after the SARS epidemic in 2002-2003. Learning from this experience, 
Taiwan's Government established in 2004 a "public health response mechanism" - 
the National Health Command Center, of which the Central Epidemic Command 
Center is a part (the Act of 19 June 2019 - on Communicable Disease Control, Art. 
17).  
 
The National Health Command Center is part of a disaster management center that 
focuses on large-outbreak response and acts as the operational command point for 
direct communications among central, regional, and local authorities 
(CDC.GOV.TW, 2020). "The CECC took an active role in resource allocation, 
including setting the price of masks and using government funds and military 
personnel to increase mask production." (Wang, Ng, and Brook, 2020). What is 
essential, "risk communication plays an important role in tackling public health 
emergencies. Effective and efficient risk communication informs people of 
potential hazards and ensures public trust, which serves as the very premise of 
successful control measures.  
 
For detailed technical information to be conveyed to the lay public and 
subsequently transformed into concrete disease control measures, the Taiwanese 
Government has employed both formal and informal channels (such as social 
media platforms and messengers) and has also worked with civic technology 
groups to facilitate two-way communication between the CECC and the public 
daily."( Ching-Fu Lin, Chien-Huei Wu, and Chuan-Feng Wu, 2020). 
 
President Tsai, already in March, announced that there is not issued an emergency 
order for the current COVID-19 situation because legal and policy tools are 
sufficient. The Legislative Yuan has quickly enacted a special law in response to 
the current pandemic: a special Act for prevention, relief, and revitalization 
measures for severe pneumonia with novel pathogens (the Act of 21 April 2020). 
 
However, most outbreak restrictions and management's legal basis during the 
epidemic is the Communicable Disease Control Act (the Act on 19 June 2019). The 
law serves as a framework for government actions during public health 
emergencies, including, among other things establishing a central platform to 
command and coordinate agencies' efforts, share information, and respond to 
inquiries (the Act on 19 June 2019, Art. 9). setting up a disease control network by 
dividing the country into regions (the Act on 19 June 2019, Art. 14), issuing 
voluntary and mandatory isolation orders (the Act on 19 June 2019, Art. 44), and 
implementing border restrictions (the Act on 19 June 2019, Art. 58-61); and other 
penal provisions (e.g., passengers who refuse to wear masks after being asked to do 
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so would be assessed a fine of NT$3,000 to NT$15,000, the Act on 19 June 2019, 
Art. 61-71).  
 
Other actions include measures on border control, case identification, resource 
allocation, implementing quarantine for all travelers who have visited regions 
walloped by the disease, and postponing schools' reopening following the winter 
break. Other provisions of the law increase the penalties to a substantial extent for 
breaking quarantine regulations on home quarantine or home isolation terms. 
Driving up the prices of supplies related to disease prevention or hoarding, such 
reserves could be punished with prison terms of up to five years. The sentence for 
spreading false information regarding the virus could be imprisonment for up to 
three years (Focus Taiwan, 2020). 
 
The Taiwanese Government combined data from the National Health Insurance 
Administration and the Immigration Agency in one day. Thanks to Big Data and 
new technology, the Government's actions have become possible, including QR 
code scanning and online reporting of travel history and health symptoms to 
classify travelers' infectious risks based on-flight origin and travel history in the 
past 14 days (Wang, Ng, and Brook, 2020). "Nevertheless, due to the early 
deployment of resources and rapid containment of the epidemic, compared to other 
countries, there are currently no large-scale store closure measures, travel 
restrictions, or physical contact bans initiated. Nor does Taiwan have curfews, stay-
at-home orders, or shutdown-of-the-city orders that undermine normal basic living 
functions" (Chien-Liang Lee, 2020). 
 
Taiwan has taken various proactive and swift risk management measures to control 
the spread of COVID-19. Ching-Fu Lin, Chien-Huei Wu, and Chuan-Feng Wu 
(2020) consider three dimensions of Taiwan's risk management strategy 
optimization of crucial medical supplies, border control, and travel bans, and 
significant data-powered mechanisms for tracking and tracing the illness (2020).  
 
On the other hand, on the official page, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 
mentioned seven crucial issues of disease prevention measures, and results as, e.g., 
preparations and early response to the COVID-19 pandemic or tackling COVID-19 
with the help of big data and AI (MOFA.GOV.TW, 2020) 
 
7. Conclusions and Recommendations  
 
The current legal regulations – at least in Poland - in emergency states are 
insufficient and disproportionate to the threat of a pandemic. The current legal 
restrictions on states of emergency do not provide solutions for many situations 
that arise in a dynamically changing reality and, what is more, in the face of the 
necessity to introduce them, the established conditions may be insufficient. Perhaps 
it is for this reason that the legislator decided to pass a new law, presenting a 
particular model of a crisis in the event of an epidemic (pandemic), but not yet 
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fulfilling the features of emergency states. Despite the Government's swift action at 
the start of the epidemic, it has failed to stop or flatten the curve.  
 
The Taiwanese model for fighting COVID-19 (Pu, 2020) influenced by the 
experience of the SARS epidemic rapid ruthless actions aimed at monitoring 
travelers, and in the following days' people who had contact with the infected, 
stabilizing the situation, excellent risk communication, calming moods, a sense of 
responsibility and self-control of the society, as well as cultural issues and 
education, and besides of all proper rules of law. Thanks to those measures, the 
introduction of an emergency state was unnecessary. 
 
Moreover, it is worth pointing out that Taiwan reacted immediately on every level, 
which was also a result of the fight against SARS in 2002. Partial restrictions in 
Poland seem redundant or disproportionate. For example, Poland reacted quickly in 
terms of flight restrictions, but people returning by land (e.g., Germany, Austria, or 
Italy) were not monitored for several days. The Government Security Center failed 
here, as it could send even a text message after each crossing the border with 
information about the need to monitor the health condition or send its data to the 
Institute of Health and Safety. An even greater mistake was organizing return 
flights to Poland without securing the passengers' return route after landing. This 
resulted in, e.g., returns by train or public transport. In Taiwan, compulsory special 
taxis were introduced, which took arrivals to the monitored quarantine's designated 
location. That is why self-control of society's behavior is so necessary, but also 
digitization. Special applications were launched very quickly in Taiwan. 
 
Considering the model of behavior in Taiwan in the fight against COVID-19 and 
the postulates relating to the simplification of the emergency states model, perhaps 
minor legislative changes in Poland that should apply to: 
 
- clarifying the definitions of the extraordinary measures and their relationship; 
- simplifying the procedure for the moment of introducing extraordinary measures;  
    including those acts as the prerogative of the President; 
- facilitating (and eliminating doubts) the process for introducing a State of  
    emergency and martial law (what if the Council of Ministers cannot meet and is  
    it unable to submit to the President a request for a State of emergency and  
   martial law?); 
- defining straightforward tasks of the Council of Ministers in crisis management; 
- increasing the role and establishing the competences of the Government Centre  
   for Security during a crisis;  
- creating new epidemic center under the Ministry of Health - like CCED;  
- campaigns primarily to raise awareness of the public. 
 
"Taiwan's success in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic is a testament to its 
democratic norms and institutions. The Government demonstrated transparency 
and honesty, as well as efficiency and good governance. Leaders avoided 
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politicizing the issue, candidly shared information and experiences, balanced 
recognition of the virus' global and local effects, and, most importantly, showed 
respect for democratic processes and values" (Liu Shih-Chung, 2020). 
 
For this reason, the authorities must organize actions, including legal ones, to 
properly prevent, prepare, react, and minimize the effects, as well as restore the 
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